Research

Migration is often linked to increased economic opportunity, yet government policy may create barriers to migration that hurt low-income populations. This paper studies one such barrier - the introduction of residency restrictions in US state welfare policy. These laws specified a residency threshold for welfare eligibility, aiming to discourage low-income migration and improve fiscal capacity for state and local governments. Using a novel dataset, I document the introduction and evolution of residency requirements in state and local governments from1850-1940. I find that adopting these restrictions reduced the probability of low-income migration into adopting states by 4% (a relative decrease of 27%). Using a discrete choice framework, I quantify broader effects of residency requirements on the geography of low-income migration and highlight their implications for the fiscal and equity trade-offs in restrictive welfare policy.

This paper studies how exposure and acess to formal welfare policy impacts ethnic enclave sorting among immigrants in the historical US. Looking at European immigrants to the US between 1900-1930, I study how an immigrant's welfare exposure pre-immigration and welfare eligibility post-immigration impacts their choice to live in a co-ethnic neighborhood. I find that immigrants who are welfare eligible in their destination state are significantly less likely to live in an ethnic enclave upon arrival, an effect that is stronger for immigrants with more prior exposure to formal welfare systems. I discuss the implications of this initial enclave sorting on the longer-term spatial and economic assimilation of immigrants during this time period. 

Revolving door laws restrict public officials from representing private interests before government after leaving office. While these laws mitigate potential conflicts of interest, they also may affect the pool of candidates for public positions by lowering the financial benefits of holding office. We study the consequences of revolving door laws for political selection in U.S. state legislatures, exploiting the staggered roll-out of laws across states over time. We find that fewer new candidates enter politics in treated states and that incumbent legislators are less likely to leave office, leading to an increase in uncontested elections. The decline in entry is particularly strong for independent and more moderate candidates, which may increase polarization. We provide a model of politician career incentives to interpret the results.